There are many differences between European and American antitrust regulation, but recent enforcement against Big Tech shows that in the most important ways they are converging on an anti-monopoly philosophy, writes Paul Friederiszick.
In the 1930s, staffers at the newly established Federal Communications Commission devised a novel rationale for limiting network power in radio, telephony, and the press. While much has changed since the “age of radio,” the concerns they raised inform the present-day debate over the control that social media platforms exert over public discourse, writes Richard R. John.
Audrye Wong writes that China is able to use its market power to pressure foreign companies and business leaders—perhaps most notably Tesla CEO Elon Musk—to lobby on its behalf. The practice raises questions about foreign influence in American and European policymaking and the disproportionate clout of business and oligarchic interests.
Allen Grunes comments on the core continuity in antitrust enforcement between the Biden and second Trump administrations. He argues that the continuity reflects, in Zephyr Teachout’s words, the “homecoming” of antitrust to the “domain of law.” The following is a revised version of remarks Grunes delivered at the Loyola Antitrust Colloquium in April.
Karina Montoya reflects on the end of the remedies phase of the Department of Justice’s case against Google for monopolizing the online search market. She argues that Google’s warnings against divestiture of its browser, Chrome, fall short and that a breakup will benefit the security of the internet, innovation, and users.
David Chan Smith argues that tariff regimes during the eighteenth century encouraged modern history’s first offshore markets to reroute goods through jurisdictions that faced lower tariff rates. This historical “entrepôt trade” could outstrip the legal trade of some goods and carries lessons for contemporary revisions to international trade.